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Abstract.  In Greek mythology the Muses –patron goddesses of fine arts, 
history, humanities, and sciences– are tellingly portrayed as the daughters 
of Zeus and Mnemosyne, the goddess Memory, who is of the race of Titans, 
older still than Zeus and other Olympian deities.  The relationship between 
memory and such fields as epic poetry, history, music and dance is easily 
recognizable to moderns. But bards/poets like Homer and Hesiod, who 
began oral storytelling by “invoking the Muses” with their audience, knew 
well that remembering, forgetting, and imagining are each to be esteemed 
as, in Hesiod’s words, “gifts of the goddesses.” The economy of memory is 
an important concern for moral psychology, philosophy of emotions, and 
philosophy of imagination. This chapter examines ways that amusements, 
both classically and today, can function to educate moral emotions in and 




1. Introduction: Mother of the Muses  
In Greek mythology the Muses – patron goddesses of fine arts, history, humanities, and science – 
are portrayed as the nine daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne; she, the earthly goddess Memory, 
is of the race of Titans, older still than Zeus and the other gods of Olympus. We sense the 
Muses’ presence in the expressive arts, but more widely in any study which we aspire to be good 
at. Hesiod felt his Muses in the hills of Mount Helicon where he purports to have both tended 
sheep and honed his skills as an oral bard. They inspired his poems including Theogony and 
Works and Days. In these poems the Muses’ first home is Mount Olympus, where they are 
favorite daughters of Zeus. When the gods are at peace and leisure they bring a “mirth” and 
“gladdening of hearts” which then extends outwards to humankind. Mnemosyne’s gifts to us are 
her daughters, and the comforts and joys they each bring. As Hesiod writes, “Every man is 
fortunate whom the Muses love; the voice flows sweet from his lips.”1 
When a bard sits his audience down aside a fire, or addresses a crowd in a more formal 
public setting such as a festival, storytelling customarily begins, as we see in the proems to 
Hesiod’s two great works, with a sort of ritual act of calling upon the Muses. In the Invocation of 
the Muses section which begins Theogony, Hesiod has the Muses collectively reply to the 
humans who piously call upon them; they encourage these beseechers to seek through them not 
only artistic inspiration but also knowledge and wisdom: 
   We know how to tell many believable lies, But also, when we want to, how to 
speak the plain truth… So start from the Muses: For when they sing for Zeus 
Father they thrill the great mind deep in Olympus, telling what is, what will be, 




While a strong positive pathos (shared values and concerns) is created between bards, 
singing with a lyre, and the listening audience, ‘invoking’ the Muses also functions to strongly 
enhance these poets’ ethos: their credibility and authority for their audience. However humbly 
they might give credit to the goddess for the truth and beauty of their words, they are establishing 
the storytelling as a sacred event, insinuating that epic tales is of divine origin, and confirming to 
their audience that poets, as keepers of cultural memory, are both honorable and wise. Since the 
Muses of poetry and story/history, through the will of Zeus, have the ability to memorialize the 
deeds and achievements of some but deny it to others, this power for all practical purposes is in 
the hands, or in the voice, of the poet. Homer’s Odyssey has Odysseus entreat king Alkinoos’ 
blind court poet to remember him alongside other heroes of the Trojan War, and even to first 
butter him up by proclaiming, “All men owe honor to the poets—honor and awe, for they are 
dearest to the Muse who puts upon their lips the ways of life.”  
But connections of the arts and sciences to memory are much richer than emphasis on 
social functions of storytelling allows us to see. Hesiod’s genealogical myth of Mnemosyne and 
her daughters runs much deeper. In “The Mother of the Muses: In Praise of Memory,” Clara 
Claiborne Park points out that “to make the Muses the daughters of Memory is to express a 
fundamental perception of the way in which creativity operates…. The Muses, for Hesiod, 
inspire all those arts of communication that inform, delight, civilize, and link us with the past and 
with our fellows.”3 The relationship between memory and such fields as epic poetry, history or 
music and dance is easily recognizable to moderns. Each requires quite serious study and 
practice in order to even become proficient in, and “mastery” is probably a relative term. Oral 
story-telling certainly served functions of codifying a people’s sense of identity; the epics, 
though they encompass not just a human but a supernatural or spiritual world, and human-divine 
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interaction, help create “tradition” (literally, ‘to hand down’) and moral lessons and exemplars. 
But commemoration, even in an oral culture running back through Homer centuries earlier than 
Hesiod, is not the only, even if it is the most apparent, value. What these poets knew who 
invoked the Muses with their audience, was that remembering, forgetting, and imagining should 
each be esteemed as, in Hesiod’s words, “gifts of the goddesses.” Such is the healing powers of 
the arts in ancient thought. Not only rememberings (commemoratings, memorializings, 
celebratings) but also forgettings and imaginings are appreciated as ‘gifts’ in the Athenian 
golden age.  
Each of these three, this chapter will argue, holds some direct bearing on the development 
of the moral emotions.4 We will examine ways that amusements, broadly understood, engage 
with the economy of memory, and function to educate the moral emotions. The moral economy 
of memory and representation is an important focus of study for moral psychology, philosophy 
of emotions, and philosophy of imagination. We will seek to naturalize the generous activity of 
the Muses by examining the economy of memory, and the ways that amusements engage the 
moral imagination and the psychological functions of remembering and forgetting.5 While initial 
examples of the moral value/disvalue of rememberings, forgettings, and imaginings are mostly 
drawn from classical Greek and Chinese cultures, these points I will suggest may also be 
applicable to the best design of networks and computer-games, and to what Chris Bateman 
(2018) terms cyber virtues and vices. 
 But to follow a bit further our initial foray into the claims to universal concerns which 
humor and comedy, and not just more serious or somber arts may encourage, let me finish this 
introduction with a few further thoughts about the positive functions of satire. Traditionally, 
comedy and humor are not seen as addressing what is universal in the human condition. Aristotle 
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at least, in the Poetics, reserves that for epic poetry and the tragic theatre which most directly 
draws upon it –and, of course, for philosophy. Comic plays in Athens often dealt with the 
politics of the day, topics including political upheavals that were oftentimes sensitive, open 
wounds for the audience. While it would seem that this could very much involve universals of 
the human condition, Aristotle seems to associate comedy with its origin in satyr plays and 
dithyrambs; this is associated with the piety of the festivals of Dionysus, but for Aristotle seems 
to lack the universal concerns expressed in the plays of the great tragedians such as Aeschylus, 
Sophocles, and Euripides. Yet this brings me to an initial thesis: On this point I want to hold that 
Aristophanes the comedic playwright, rather than Aristotle, is correct. Perhaps to rebut such 
opinions, and to respond to the appearance that all wisdom is in the more traditional forms, 
Aristophanes has one of his characters bravely declare, “Comedy, too, can sometimes discern 
what is right. I shall not please, but I shall say what is true.”6  
The intellectual value of good satire includes the ability to utilize cultural differences to 
critique one’s own culture’s assumptions. This is something that Michel do Montaigne, for 
example does with “On Cannibals,” where simpler, natural virtues of the ‘savage’ encountered 
by Europeans in the age of discovery, are used to counter ethnocentric bias and to expose the 
much crueler and more authoritarian – more ‘cannibalistic’ – European society lying below its 
civilized veneer. The greater the moral and cognitive dissonance that the satirical perspective 
instigates, the more that these incongruities work to create humor. In these respects too, 
bemusement might be just as important as amusement, since bemusement perhaps more clearly 
brings in the universals of the human condition, putting in ironic focus our human frailties and 
biases, and our inability to see them (see also Lauren Olin, this volume). Bemusement retains its 
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importance whether one takes a panglossian, skeptical, or melioristic interpretation of the 
evidence of our cognitive shortcomings. 
Montaigne’s essay “On Cannibals” and Aristophanes’ many satiric plays deal with 
‘uncomfortable’ topics of violence and power, reason and the passions, our civilized and our 
natural state. In their political context, these political satires could be seen as affronts to the 
governing body. But humor excuses much, especially when presented as only personal musing, 
or as a play for the annual City Dionysia. Also, while the all-male stage actors and audience of 
the plays performed in the Athenian amphitheater could easily choose to ignore such ironies as 
women running the city better than them, or their wives using a sex-strike against them to force 
cooperation and compromise with the Spartans to make an end to forge peace out of bitter war, 
in the best interests of all. These comic ‘absurdities’ were at least lessons in perspective-shifting, 
and in the possibilities of more cooperative thinking, generally. At a deeper level they are also 
invitations to more radical moral and/or political reform. Whether Aristophanes truly meant them 
as such, and why and how the audience could partake of the play but then go back to daily 
political life without any genuine moral impact, are two questions we must set aside. But a fine 
example of humorous incongruity which clearly involves the audience in timeless or universal 
questions comes from Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae (Assembly of Women). In this play Athenian 
women, (purportedly as a strategy of last resort since nothing else has worked), come in charge 
of the Assembly (or Parliament). Almost immediately they begin to propose major utopian-qua-
egalitarian reforms. Conceptual incongruities arise as utopian dreams collide with unquestioned 




Praxagora:  I want all to have a share of everything and all property to be in 
common; there will no longer be either rich or poor; [...] I shall begin by 
making land, money, everything that is private property, common to 
all….  
 
Blepyrus:  But who will till the soil?  
 




a. Commemoration and Competition 
The recognition and commemoration of greatness in Greek and Roman cultures of 
antiquity illustrates how central their own cultural history was to them. Narrative structure 
implicates memetic connections: a story must itself be remembered, the metered verses put to 
memory and typically sung to the accompaniment of a musical instrument. Their sacred 
narratives or mythology provided the bulk of narrative content for the arts to work with, but there 
were statues and commemorations of many sorts, for what is unique is the ways that the Greeks 
sought to recognize and remember greatness of many kinds. In this respect Nietzsche tells us that 
orators, painters, sculptors, musicians, poets, and stage choreographers, no less than champions 
in physical contests and Pan-Hellenic games, might vie for special recognition. Competitions in 
the emerging arts were of such interest to the Athenians that if they couldn’t hope to achieve 
cultural immortality in the way of ancient heroes who interacted with the gods, the Greeks still 
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saw themselves as competing for honor and glory under the constant gaze of those gods from 
above. More practically, success might well mean having their names inscribed in stone as 
winners, and as benefactors of the city, and receive ‘meals and a pension’ (as Socrates, after his 
conviction, tells the jury that as teacher and benefactor of Athens, he deserves ‘far more than 
punishment’).  
We can remember from different moral emotions of pride and shame.9 Hesiodic ‘good 
Eris’ creates the kind of jealously or strife ‘between potter and potter,” the arts flourished and 
winners were commemorated and remembered in ways that add their achievements to cultural 
memory. Nietzsche comments on how telling was Hesiod’s account of their being not one, but 
two goddesses Eris: jealousy. The competitions of the occasional Muse festivals were not as 
regular either as the City Dionysia or Pan-Hellenic games. But Nietzsche also recounts several 
instances of people being remembered for shameful, unjust or unfitting acts, pettiness, and bad 
eris. Hesiod begins Works and Days with this distinction between striving for excellence and the 
kind of jealousy he associates with killing, and mastery over others. Bad jealousy or strife is not 
of the good kind associated with the ordered rule of Themis (Divine Law) and her civilizing 
daughters (Justice, Order, and Peace), but rather with those frightful but undeniable forces, the 
‘Children of Night’ (Thanatos; Nemesis; the Keres or battlefield goddesses of cruel and 
unnatural death, the vengeful Furies and many more).10  
In the “Homer’s Contest,” an essay written shortly after The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche 
skillfully explains how agonistic Greek society was, and because of this how useful good eris or 
competition was in serving to redirect of ‘channel’ aggressive drives –those bloodlusts, 
conquering or vengeful, which predominated in the earlier Homeric age and in that of the 
Mycenaeans featured in Homeric epic. Although we cannot digress, it is important to note that 
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Nietzsche places the philosophers within, rather than above, this competition for recognition as 
wise. The mythos/logos distinction and the uniqueness of natural and speculative philosophical 
inquiry from both poetry and sophistry is a complex set of issues, but in the cultural context of 
Athenian society it is part of the philosopher’s competitive claim to wisdom.11 
 
b. Museums and Cultural Memory 
Besides Zeus’ shining halls and human settings where creative and artistic excellence is 
fostered or specific crafts (techne; τέχνη) like astronomy, history, or medicine are pursued, the 
other earthly home for the Muses is the museum, originally simply meaning ‘Shrine to the 
Muses.’ The politics of museums can serve as a prime example of amusements that directly 
involve us in moral debate over cultural memory and its ownership. When a museum’s 
collections have a history stemming from war, colonialism, or economic and cultural dominance, 
their leading narratives have come under scrutiny. Today for example there is ongoing debate 
about the ethics of collecting artifacts such as native people’s bones, and African or native 
people’s rituals ornaments. Attitudes towards museum holdings appear to be in flux. The older 
‘white man’s burden’ rationale of removal for the sake of preservation and appreciation is 
increasingly challenged by persons who identify with groups whose cultural memory is on 
display and found to be presented with a certain ‘master’ narrative. The most high-profile case in 
point is the long-standing debate concerning whether the British Museum should maintain its 
ownership of the Parthenon Marbles or submit to pressure to repatriate them to their native 
Greece. That these were, until only recently, widely referred to and identified as the “Elgin 
Marbles” after the colonial appropriator Thomas Bruce, Seventh Earl of Elgin, who removed 
them from the Parthenon and Acropolis (he claimed with consent of the Ottomans who ruled 
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Greece at the start of the 19th Century) and sold them to the British government, is itself part of 
the long-standing battle over how they should be remembered. The renaming of the marbles by 
their name of origin rather than collector may be a significant step forward, even while the 
Museum maintains its stance against demands for their repatriation.  
This of course is but one instance of the debate over cultural memory as if affects the 
modern museum, since the repatriation-of-antiquities movement has been gaining strength over 
recent decades. “Preserving – saving” is for some a euphemistic phrase for confiscated property. 
As Graham Black points out in “Museums, Memory, and History,” “The process by which 
communities and nations remember collectively itself has a history. For museums, as for the 
official memory written by historians, selectivity has been a key element. The core criticism of 
museums as instruments of the state is that the version of the past they have given form to is 
based on the selective collection, preservation and presentation of evidence of past human 
society.” For Black the key critical concern is the prioritizing of elites: “Objects relating to 
wealthier classes have a far higher likelihood of survival… [I]n the process of collecting this 
material, museums both create knowledge and manipulate it, and through interpretation and 
transmission they define its relative importance or authority. Meanwhile, the silences in a 
museum's collections and narratives is just as revealing. What goes unacknowledged, 
accidentally or purposely ‘forgotten’?”12 
Supporters of this repatriation movement, including groups of native peoples, see a return 
of artifacts as a symbolic means of healing a past wrong, and a kind of restitution for earlier 
humiliation. In this sense it allows forgetting of wrongs, insofar as museum collections much like 
trophies from safari’s, were the handmaids of colonialism. Although focused on the more overt 
case of Hitler’s confiscations and plundering of art during WWII, the book and film, The 
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Monuments Men has in an indirect way spurred thinking about what distinguishes the colonial-
era acquisition of certain high-profile museum collections from mere exploitation. The response 
to demands for repatriation of antiquities is typically one that concedes the colonial background, 
but bids people to set this aside as now historical, and to join in the educational ideals of the 
“universal museum”: One should be able to experience all things in one place, under one roof. 
The “return” of artifacts presupposes the fiction that the activists are owners of particular cultural 
traditions, and reflects cultural particularism or segregation. 
 
c. Laughter, Mockery, and Democratic Values 
In a recent collection, Greek Memories: Theories and Practices (2019) Mirko Canevaro 
writes, “In fact, memory of the past, of the laws, of the culture, even of the day-to-day life of the 
city was a necessary attribute of the Athenian citizen.” Any citizen is the new democracy might 
present themselves in an oratory role, such as a funeral oration, a theatre production, a 
symposium, or whenever called upon as a testifier or even a juror in the Athenian court. There 
were expectations that came back as judgments of personal and civic virtue. “The Athenians 
expected the speakers to show a high degree of cultural, historical and legal knowledge and 
memory.”13 Isocrates, an orator with whom Socrates is thought to have been familiar, and who 
set up a school of rhetoric in Athens some years after Socrates’ death (but before the self-exiled 
Plato returned to Athens and opened the Lyceum), makes this expectation upon citizens for right 
use of cultural memory explicit: “For the deeds of the past are, indeed, an inheritance common to 
us all; but the ability to make proper use of them at the appropriate time, to conceive the right 
sentiments about them in each instance, and to set them forth in finished phrase, is the peculiar 
gift of the wise.”14 
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These demands on proper or virtuous memory, especially as amplified by a focus on 
oratory and rhetoric, must be seen together with concerns about unvirtuous laughter, and 
personal but uncivic/uncivil hubris. The criminal charge of hubris, or graphē hubreōs, played a 
role in what John Lombardini investigates in The Politics of Socratic Irony (2018). In Athens, 
the prosecution of  graphē hubreōs, while it may not have occurred regularly, had special 
connection with democratic values, and so much so that as odd as it may seem, acts of hubris in 
the form of verbal abuses by masters even against their own slaves could be a chargeable 
crime.15 
Today we have serious issues of “rancorous humor,” where superiority and put-down 
leads to an escalation of polarized and polemical discourse. Rancor-promoting actions and bad 
eris go closely together, and both butt up against freedom of speech.16 But since well before 
Plato’s Philebus and the Taoist book of wisdom, Zhuangzi, the ancients engaged in debate over 
what makes something appropriately laughable. The latter is a witty and light-hearted set of 
narratives which highlight strong connections between well-being and play. “But there is 
laughter and laughter of course,” writes Michael Nylan, author of The Chinese Pleasure Book 
(2018). The summer cicada can understand nothing of the progress of the seasons, nor the turtle 
dove and quail whose whole lives are limited to brush and branches, understand the soaring 
heights and long journeys of the great bird Peng. So they mock it: Who should have need or 
desire to fly so high? Just where does he think he’s going? 
The first chapter of Zhuangzi introduces the mocking laughter exemplified 
by the complacent cicada, turtle dove, and quail. We know these types well: 
thinking they know everything, they heap ridicule on anyone or anything 
unlike them, when, in actuality, they have not left themselves open to new 
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experiences. This sort of dissociating self-satisfaction exacts too high a 
price, as does the superficially affable laughter designed to trap the 
unwary.17 
 
 The Taoist sage aims to lighten and enlighten oneself and others. “A 
willingness to accept pain and vulnerability as necessary, even valuable components 
of the human condition, plus a lightheartedness –this is precisely what is lost in most 
of the pious academic accounts of Zhuangzi.... So in an era that valuing dramatic 
oratory and rhetoric, Zhuangzi would [have us all] steer clear of virtuoso performances 
and forget the slights that daily life inflicts, the ressentiments that gnaw away at one’s 
core.”18 
In the Athenian context, Socrates’ accusers clearly try to link his purported anti-
democratic tendencies with purported instances of his using inappropriate laughter of a ‘put-
down’ sort. Especially in an honor culture, mockery becomes a hot-button issue, as is clear from 
Xenophon’s treatment of Socrates, also. Socrates’ irony (eirôneia), and his ‘gelastic practices,’ 
were at least subtext to his indictment as a ‘corruptor of the youth,’ and we clearly see this in 
how Plato defends him in this regard, both in the Apology and elsewhere. In Plato’s thematized 
account of the trial, the jury is reminded by Socrates’ accusers of ‘sophistical Socrates’ in 
Aristophanes’ comic satire, Clouds, staged at the Athens City Dionysia of 423 BCE. Lombardini 
comments,  
 
[T]he ambiguity surrounding the Socratic practice of humor in the Platonic 
dialogues is perhaps indicative of the contested legacy of humor in the fourth 
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century. While, as [Stephen Halliwell, Greek Laughter, 2008] argues, the Platonic 
Socrates does not engage in overt, face-to-face mockery, he does deploy irony as 
a mode of tactical ridicule…and is often harsh in mocking himself and the 
arguments in which he participates. What Plato offers us, in sum, is ‘an 
ambiguous, double-sided figure where laughter is concerned’ [and] ‘it is 
probable…that this ambiguity was part of Plato’s conscious response to a larger, 
ongoing contest for the memory and posthumous image of the man himself.’19  
 
I would add that if Nietzsche is right, philosophers are not above this contest of claims-
to-wisdom, but very much in it. The philosophers invent a “new kind of agon” which they 
describe as truth and wisdom-directed, but which also explains how a figure like Socrates could 
inspire resentment. Nietzsche thinks of philosophers such as Plato, Thales and Xenophanes as 
actively competing in and expecting to win ‘Homer’s Contest,” for “we do not understand the 
full strength of Xenophanes' attack on the national hero of poetry [Homer], unless—as again 
later with Plato—we see that at its root lay an overwhelming craving to assume the place of the 
overthrown poet and to inherit his fame….”20 
To summarize and conclude this section, Greek society was highly preoccupied with 
cultural memory, and with the prospects of male citizens in their own time to gain some 
semblance of the immortality-through-memorialization seen as being enjoyed by the heroes and 
demi-gods of the mythic past. But in agonistic societies like Athens and like our own the 
distinction between good and bad eris remains morally significant. If we look we can find many 
instances of both motivations in the ways that the past is remembered.21 
3. Forgettings  
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The passage of time and the availability of amusements and interests in arts, literature, or 
science greatly aids our ability to cope with, and to recover from distress or sufferings of our 
own. Hesiod speaks of the emotion of amusement in terms of “respite from cares” through “care-
free hearts” moved by song, story, and other a-musements (no-troublings/cares).  Attention-
diverting pleasures, whether of arts, science, or simply of humor or good conversation with 
friends, are forgettings which grant repose to persons from distress, anxiety, fear, or grief. As 
early as Solon's Prayer to the Muses (6th century BCE), scholars have pointed out, the gifts of 
Muses were understood to include “not only in the grief- destroying power of song but also in 
the persuasion and the 'intellectual' achievement of the king who succeeds in talking the parties 
of a lawsuit into a peaceful settlement of their conflicting claims."22 
On the social scale, forgetting and forgiveness allow for the ebbing of cycles of 
vengeance and the re-emergence of social compacts and of the mutual benefits of trust. Dan 
O’Shannon in this connection notes the old saying, “Tragedy plus time equals comedy.” The 
value of safe distance, he suggests, “allows us to enjoy pain on several levels. There may be a 
conscious or unconscious element of relief in laughter, as in the sudden realization that we can 
be close to this experience of harm and yet not be hurt.”23 (Ironically for a god many feminists 
describe as a ‘master rapist,’) Apollo is a god associated with healing, and if this were only 
through the actual medical arts then the poets would not be depicted as often in the company of 
the Muses, and as having Thalia, the masking and unmasking Muse of comedy and humor, his 
most genuine romance. Thalia, whose name is etymologically connected with “flourishing” and 
“joyous,” is a goddess of not just of theater but more generally of laughter and joyful play. Now 
mocking humor and even Socratic irony was, as we will later see, a contentious issue in the new 
Athenian city-state, as it was taken by many to connote anti-democratic values or traits of 
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character. But our human aptitude for laughter, and the benefit we derive not just from theatre 
but from all study of arts and sciences is mythologically an aphthonos, or “generous activity” of 
the gods. It is a gift-bestowing to humankind consequent from divine laughter instilled in mighty 
Zeus by his loving and ever-surprising daughters.24 
Words inspired by the Muses are classically associated with peace, the results of sweet soft 
words versus their harsh contraries. Forgetting, to the extent that it allows rebuilding or building 
trust, is a unifier. Like Homer and Hesiod, Aristophanes within his own poetry (Frogs, performed 
403 BCE) finds time to laud “the noble poets”. 
   Look how right from the start the noble poets have been useful—been teachers: 
Orpheus taught us initiations and avoidance of bloodletting, Mousaious taught divination 
and cures for sickness, and Hesiod, the working of the soil and the seasons of harvest and 
plowing.25 
One literary example of this is the Aeneid and its central themes. Greek and Roman poet 
often engaged in etymological ‘play’ with the names and associations of the gods, and here 
Virgil juxtaposes Juno's grudges and plans for vengeance with the memory actively fostered by 
the Muses, which by their nature seeks concordia and works through concordant purposes. The 
healing power of forgetting and moving on supports reconciliation and renewal. As Alex Hardie 
in “Juno, Hercules, and the Muses at Rome” (2007) comments,  
 
‘Mindful anger’ and its corollary in revenge is of course a very old idea (indeed 
the homophone endings memorem ... iram might be designed to recall the sound-
similarity of Greek menis ("anger") and mnēmnō ("mindful"); anger, in other 
words, is inherently endowed with a long memory). Juno's "mindful anger" 
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evidently has to do with the goddess' capacity for harbouring grudges, and it is 
recognisable, in terms more immediately applicable in the civic sphere, as the 
standard political fault of mnēsikakein ("harbouring grudges")…. Juno's inability 
to set aside former causae irarum in the interests of general harmony is a 
fundamental component of her discordant character within the poem.26 
 
Ancient tragedies dealt deeply with universal themes of retribution and grief. “Such is 
life,” wrote Sophocles. “Laugh, if you can.” Martha Nussbaum and others who appreciate 
tragedy’s contributions to educating moral emotions will agree with the Greeks and with 
Aristotle (and contemporary psychology) that the experiencing of negative emotions and even of 
suffering is not without purgative and educative value.27 But Nussbaum’s book Anger and 
Forgiveness (2018) provides rich discussion with of both historical and literary examples of 
overcoming cycles of violent retribution and of the zero-sum or loss-loss thinking the fuels it. 
While acknowledging it some inevitability, she tries to show how anger is often a confused and 
damaging or pernicious moral emotion. 
 Nussbaum’s own main literary example of such virtuous forgettings is Aeschylus’ tragic 
trilogy, The Oresteia, which is known to have won first prize at the Dionysia festival in 458 
BCE. The trilogy is named for the central character Orestes, who sets out to avenge the murder 
of his father Agamemnon by his own (undoubtedly abused) mother, Clytemnestra. Vengeance or 
vendetta and justice, and the emergence of law out of a more primitive system of vendettas, are 
its central themes as Nussbaum articulates them. But what she finds especially insightful is its 
concluding scenes. The slaying of Clytemnestra and her lover by Orestes does not end the cycle 
of violence, but unleashes the Furies, divine avengers, to pursue and punish Orestes for his act of 
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matricide. The justice of their retribution on Orestes is eventually brought to trial before the 
gods, with wise Athena aiding the pardon of Orestes and proclaiming that matters of retribution 
or punishment be henceforth settled in court rather than being carried out personally and outside 
of law. But to undergird this societal shift in the conception of justice, one which quelled endless 
cycles of retaliation and analogized them to a curse, Athena actually renames the force from the 
Furies. She names them the Eumenides, meaning the “gracious ones,” which in effect 
disconnects justice from backward-looking retribution and attaches it to a broader set of forward-
looking concerns including social stability, and the welfare of the polis and its citizens, and the 
healing of wounds. Besides The Oresteia concluding on these surprisingly optimistic themes of 
renewal and moving beyond cycles of vendetta-justice, the audience would have seen a short 
comical satyr play to conclude the evening’s official festivities, and to ensure they are ushered 
out into the streets in a high mood of revelry.   
We could also find ancient Chinese examples of successful and failed forgettings.28 One 
of the most famous plays of China is The Peony Pavilion, a tragi-comedy of the human condition 
written in the Ming style by Tang Xianzu, who lived contemporaneously with Shakespeare and 
is sometimes referred to as the ‘Shakespeare of China.’ The play features a young woman, Miss 
Du, who falls asleep in a peony field. In the dream sequences typical of the Ming style (and often 
of modern Peking opera) she meets and falls in deeply love with a young, handsome scholar. 
This young man Liu is real, but she has never met him and upon awakening to find his memory 
but a dream, she develops an all-consuming love sickness, and a utopian desire for a kind of 
pure, unfettered love that would have been impossible in the character’s structured society. At 
the end of the first act Miss Du, unable to forget, eventually mourns herself to death. But in the 
second act, Liu’s passing on foot through the garden where she is buried, years later, learns her 
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story through a self-portrait she left before she died. True love wins out after Liu falls into a love 
with the dead girl so genuine that the Flower Goddess and the Judge of Hell eventually get 
involved, and conspire to resurrect Miss Du in order to fulfil what is seen as a destiny that time 
and circumstance had unjustly prevented. The two characters’ inability to forget brings them 
great sorrow, yet through the power of their virtuous forgetting of the rigid social roles and 
codes, their true love in the end prevails. 
The healing power of time, and of the arts as diversions and sources of amusement 
connects with psychological study of the Fading Affect Bias (FAB), which refers to the 
demonstrated greater dwindling of unpleasant compared to pleasant emotions in autobiographical 
memory. The FAB appears to be a ubiquitous emotion regulating phenomenon in 
autobiographical memory. T.D. Ritchie (et. al.), (2015) for example disclose studies showing that 
positive affect fades slower than negative affect. “Results suggest that in tandem with local 
norms and customs, the FAB may foster recovery from negative life events and promote the 
retention of the positive emotions, within and outside of the USA.”29 Affective fading is 
generally greater for negative events/memories than for positive events/memories, but this 
greater dwindling of unpleasant compared to pleasant emotions is impacted by other traits. 
Dysphorics and those with depression or anxiety disorders show a smaller fading affect than non-
dysphorics.  
To conclude this section, Marx and other materialists have seen retreat into constant 
amusement as a dysfunctional response to one’s state of alienation. Critics of big media have 
worried that we are, in Neil Postman’s terms, “amusing ourselves to death” (1984), and they 
sound a Huxleyan warning of its goal of pacifying its consumers and keeping them glued to 
advertising or political agendas. Escapist withdrawal through endless amusements might give 
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one a sense of individual autonomy, while in reality leaving individuals more isolated and less 
motivated or equipped to find the solidarity with others. Amusements and the forgettings they 
allow might be sought as compensation for a deficit of opportunities for meaningful choices and 
genuinely human relations. Still, today’s teens do not demote virtual realities as past generations 
arguably have. Contemporary amusements and virtual world are, but are not only, ‘escapes’ from 
troubles. With Jean Baudrillard today’s youth tend to accord reality to simulations along a 
spectrum, and reject the Platonic binary of one’s being either “in reality” or “under illusion.” 
Years ago when I presented the Matrix movie’s choice between ‘taking the red or the blue pill,’ 
uncomfortable truth or pleasant medicated illusion, to my philosophy students almost 
unanimously vowed they would take the red pill no matter how far down the rabbit hole they 
might fall. It seems to me not merely anecdotal that today by comparison many more of my 
students, when presented with ‘Cypher’s Choice’ or ‘The Experience Machine thought 
experiments that have been staples of introductory philosophy classes for decades, will say that 
while truth and freedom are values, their decision would also turn on just how badly “reality” 
sucks. 
 
4. Imaginings  
According to contemporary enactivists and narrativists like Daniel Hutto and Peter Goldie, 
the emotions have a structure that is “ripe for narration.”30 Pleasure comes from anticipation, 
from direct experience, and from reminiscing our past experiences. The first and third of these 
modes of pleasure, at least, are structured by narrative imagination. Many scholars have also 
described how vital stories are to our sense of individual identity and collective belonging. Some 
go further to assert and develop the educative value of stories, which may present conflicts and 
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dilemmas that spur critical reflection. Larry Hill, a Seneca storyteller, writes, "Our stories were 
us, what we knew, where we came from and where we were going. They were told to remind of 
us of our responsibility, to instruct, and to entertain. There were stories of the Creation, our 
travels, our laws. There were legends of hard-fought battles, funny anecdotes - some from the 
smokehouse, some from the trickster - and there were scary stories to remind us of danger, 
spiritual and otherwise. Stories were our life and they still are."”31   
Let us briefly return to Nussbaum’s work, since she has been one of the strongest and most 
eloquent proponents of the benefits of literature and narrative imagination for moral 
development. In The New Religious Intolerance (2012) she discusses how sympathetic 
imagination makes others real for us: “A common human failing is to see the whole world from 
the point of view of one’s own goals, and to see the conduct of others as all about oneself…By 
imagining other people’s way of life, we don’t necessarily learn to agree with their goals, but we 
do see the reality of those goals for them. We learn that other worlds of thought and feeling 
exist.” Nussbaum calls on educators to counter new and old forms of intolerance “through 
deliberate cultivation of the imagination.”32 The “participatory imagination” she takes as a 
primate inheritance, but as already inviting us to see others as intelligibly pursuing human goals. 
The participatory imagination can raise awareness of what John Rawls calls the ‘burdens of 
judgement,’ and to this extent support tolerance and mutual respect (what Rawls terms 
reasonable pluralism). For empirical support, Nussbaum cites the studies of Daniel Batson as 
showing “that vivid imagination leads, other things equal, to helping behavior.” She also holds 
that with the development of empathetic (moral) out of participatory imagination, people learn to 
“move in a direction opposite to that of fear. In fear, a person’s attention contracts, focusing 
intently on her own safety, and (perhaps) that of a small circle of loved ones. In empathy the 
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mind moves outward, occupying many different positions outside the self.”33 This shift from 
contracting to expanding moral attention aids development of moral judgment and cooperative, 
win-win strategies of problem-solving. Empathy she concedes can have its own narcissism, and 
partiality can also be a “pitfall of imagination.” But the directional difference from contracting to 
expanding one’s moral attention show imagination as, on balance, “valuable as an antidote to 
fear’s narcissism.”34 Nussbaum’s stance is one that draws not just on literature, but on 
psychology and on John Dewey’s pragmatism. Dewey held that reason is an imaginative 
capacity, and proclaimed, ‘imagination is more moral than moralities.’35 Habit, imagination, and 
judgment are intimately related; the faculty of imagination has the ability to make things present 
which were previously absent.36 Other pragmatists like Steven Fesmire credit Dewey for framing 
a theory of ecological imagination that is compatible with contemporary cognitive research.37 
But there is also a skepticism or pessimist that runs contrary to this optimism about the benefits 
of narratives that we have seen Nussbaum and others express. Skepticism may begin with a 
political realism about cultural or collective memory, and proceeds from there. Andrew Leutzsch 
investigates these confliction views in Historical Parallels, Commemoration and Icons (2019). 
One focus of the study is the inflationary erecting of monuments and other ways that historians, 
professional or amateur, “prefigure the future by constructing the past.” 
   
[A]rchives store and destroy; and historians select and ignore sources – 
sometimes accidentally, sometimes on purpose but always because all of them are 
embedded in a discourse and in a net of connotations, which tells them and us 
what matters and what does not…. Memorials are both an indicator and a factor 
of the political discourse – they represent history and contribute to the making of 
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it. [As Reinhart Koselleck puts it], ‘To commemorate the deceased belongs to 
human culture. To commemorate the fallen, violently killed, those who in battle, 
civil war or war died, belongs to political culture.’”38  
 
Leutzsch acknowledges the politics of memory, but remains optimistic about historical narrative. 
“Whereas the contingency of the future compels us to consider what might come next, the past 
makes us reflect about why events transpired as they did and contributes to the reduction of the 
future’s contingency.”39 (3) But other authors are still more critical of the “historical fallacy,” 
and of the value of narratives in pursuing epistemic goods of knowledge and understanding. On 
this minority report, story-telling and self-deception often go hand-in-hand. 
As Baldwin observed in a much-discussed 1970 exchange with Margaret Mead about 
identity, race, and moral sentiments, “What we call history is perhaps a way of avoiding 
responsibility for what has happened, is happening, in time.” 40 Perhaps the fullest recent 
development of pessimism about the moral and cognitive value of historical narratives, is Alex 
Rosenberg’s How History Gets Things Wrong: The Neuroscience of Our Addiction to Stories 
(2018). Rosenberg critiques our long-standing reliance on auto-biographical, biographical, and 
historical narrative, presenting numerous examples of its unreliability. The narrativization and 
moralization of events typically go hand-in-hand, and most often our stories re-enforce us/them 
divisions. So much are they a reflection and re-enforcement of group biases that they undermine 
history’s pretention to provide real understanding of the past, present, or future. Rosenberg 
argues for three provocative claims counterpoint to Dewey and Nussbaum: “that our confidence 
in history, our taste, our need for it, indeed, our love of history is almost completely hardwired, 
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that history is all wrong, and that its wrongness is the result of the later evolution of what was 
originally hardwired….”41 
 
Nussbaum’s narrative optimism and Rosenberg’s narrative pessimism are two contrary 
moral appraisals of storytelling, two contrary responses to the narrativist-enactivist claim that the 
emotions have a structure that is ripe with or for narration. We need not feel bound to choice 
between them; Rosenberg’s critique of history, even if it is not overstated, may not carry over to 
the value of narratives which recognize themselves as fictional.42 We can anyway take this 
‘ripeness” as a mixed blessing. For the pro-educative and the skeptical perspectives on the moral 
value of narratives have at least this in common: they each tell us that we need to ‘Stop feeding 
the wrong wolf’; that is, we need to distinguish bad from good eris and accept responsibility for 
the problems of the world. There is a concept of German origin in recent use, 
Gestaltungskompetenz, which perhaps deserves recognition here in regard to the educative 
potential of the moral imagination. It is a feminine noun term for the competency to shape the 
future; this ‘shaping skill’ is one both of analyzing present problems and applying forward-
looking problem-solving’; it a creative competence to shape the future.43 Since shared stories, 
shared amusements, and share humor often functions as a social lubricant, their ability to support 
the evolution of social cooperation should be unsurprising. We can, we must, as Nietzsche’s self-
overcoming Zarathustra says, become people who can laugh and philosophize at the same time. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Hesiod’s theme running through both Works and Days of there being ‘two Eris-goddesses 
on earth’ was, for Nietzsche, “one of the most noteworthy Hellenic thoughts and worthy to be 
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impressed on the newcomer immediately at the entrance-gate of Greek ethics.”44 So too, 
Nietzsche adds, if “we remove the contest from Greek life, then we look at once into the pre-
Homeric abyss of horrible savagery, hatred, and pleasure in destruction.” Contests of all sorts 
allowed the Greeks to channel their aggressive drives into great and works and memorable 
achievements. This is the good eris at work, the kind in which potter competes with potter for 
excellence, playwright with playwright. But as Nietzsche insists, the line between motivating and 
“hateful” envy is quite thin; both for individuals and for groups it can be difficult not to cross 
over into spite and odium, too often with dire consequences.45  
So how can amusements involving rememberings, forgettings, and imaginings better 
serve critical thinking and other pedagogical functions through actively engaging the moral 
imagination? How can they be examples of good and not bad eris? These questions I suspect 
need to be asked with respect to the design of computer games and human-machine relationships 
of all kinds. Posing them helps further identify what Chris Bateman (2018) terms the cyber 
virtues/vices which we encounter in relationship with games and online groups/networks.46 
Relational virtuosity, then, does not stop with relations only between human, or between humans 
and animals, but extends to human-machine relations as well. And Aristophanes was right: 
humor or comedy can also tell truth; it can, as he has Aeschylus say of all the poets, “rouse the 
citizenry to strive to equal” them, and to emulate the hero-types. We would be better off in the 
study of amusement had the ability to engage universals of the human condition and to provoke 
reflective morality never been ceded to only to the ‘serious’ poetic forms of epic and tragedy. 
Given also that use of humor and of computers contributes to student-focused learning, is 
important that the educative potential of laughter and of amusements more generally be brought 
to the fore. ‘Funny is the new deep,’ as Steve Almond (2015) puts it, and we have here 
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endeavored to connect this with the ability of amusements, whether more associated with 
remembering, forgetting, or imagining, to throw light on our human foibles, and to balance 
competitive games with the encouragement of cooperative strategies of problem-solving. We 
end, then, in agreement with Percy Shelley that, “A person to be greatly good must imagine 
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Notes 
1 Hesiod, Theogony, 96-97. 
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2 Hesiod, Theogony  26-28, 36-37. I here take liberty to slightly combine lines from what are said 
to be two proems (1-35 and 36-115). 
3 Clara Claiborne Park, “The Mother of the Muses: In Praise of Memory.”  
4 The functions of story are recognized to be diverse, some for entertainment, but others aimed at 
moral or intellectual edification. Still, the Muses can only be speaking in metaphor by 
describing the functions of music and narrative as allowing us to speak ‘plain truth.’ Artistic 
expressions are necessary because truth and meaning are neither ultimately separable nor 
conceptually coextensive.  Another collection which focuses on how information is often 
filtered, selected and rearranged to support a single narrative is A. Leutzsch (ed.), 2019. 
5 See also the Paola Ceccarelli, Silvia Milanezi, and Lea Grace Canevaro, and Catherine Darbo-
Peschanski chapters in the excellent collection edited by Luca Castagnoli and Paola Ceccarelli, 
Greek Memories (2019). 
6 Aristophanes’ The Acharnians, lines 500-501. From Aristophanes (2013), 32. 
7 For more direct connections between imagination and utopian-dystopian hopes and fears, see 
Darko Suvin, Defined by a Hollow (2000). 
8 Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae (Assemblywomen), lines 590-591 & 597-598 & 651 (tr. O'Neill 
1938, accessed from Perseus). 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text.jsp?doc=Aristoph.+Eccl.+590  
9  See also Bongrae Seok’s Moral Psychology of Confucian Shame (2017) for a highly 
interdisciplinary and comparative interpretation of Confucian shame as a moral disposition 
valued in Chinese culture for its motivations to moral self-cultivation. Shame in this Confucian 
sense is not for ‘losers’ but for reflective and self-critical moral leaders. Guilt is usually seen as 
an emotion with more ameliorative value in Western cultures, but this tends to be reversed in 
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collectivist cultures. So comparison of guilt and moral shame as moral emotions is an important 
topic (and one that readily invites cross-cultural comparison). While we might learn from each, 
rememberings and forgettings might be made salient by these moral emotions in somewhat 
different ways. 
10 Greek justice was becoming heir to Themis/Dike, with her balanced scales. As early as   
Pindar (5th c. BCE) the daughters of “wise-counselled” (euboulos) Themis/Justitia are assigned 
names which fittingly meant “Justice,” "Good Order/Laws,” and “Peace.” 
11 Robert Fowler (2011) points out, “As discourses calling themselves mythoi more and more 
routinely came in for questioning, sooner or later a mythos itself became a questionable 
thing….” He rightly insists, however, that “a simple linear progression from an age of 
primitive, mythical thinking to a wholly civilized and rational one is more self-serving morality 
tale than history.” (48) But probably first with Plato, mythos becomes directly associated with 
what poets tell. In Phaedrus (esp. 229c-d) widespread awareness of rationalization of myth and 
its methods is apparent. But even here Fowler insists the contrast is not so much between 
reason and its contraries. “Logoi are contrasted with mythoi in point of veracity, rather than on 
the basis of its mode of inquiry or assumptions.” Still, Fowler writes, “By the end of Aristotle’s 
life the word ‘mythography’ existed to denote that branch of prose literature which recorded, 
precisely, the Greek myths. Historians thereafter routinely use myth-words to denote the period 
down to either the Trojan War or the return of the Herakleidai (the difference is immaterial). 
No one outright denies the actual existence of figures such as Theseus, but after Thucydides’ 
mythōdes historians have to take a stand on these stories, and a question mark hangs over them. 
Typically they accept the basic historicity, but remove the mythical accretions (for which the 
poets bear the blame) to render them useful for various purposes” (50).  
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12 Black, “Museums, Memory, and History,” 421. Black’s treatment of museums might also 
make us think of the inhumanity-for-the-sake of amusement, in the Black Mirror episode, 
“Black Museum”! To be “put in a museum” used to be a saying for being made useless –a relic. 
But today the museum is returning to some of its interactive functions: To muse upon 
something should be to reflect or engage in a creative way, opening up new ideas. But re-
thinking the moral ideals of the museum, which stays stationary but brings “universal” content 
to itself, extends to a rethinking of the many forms of entertainment traditionally involving 
traveling shows. From thespian wagons, imaginariums, ‘freak shows,’ and circuses, traveling 
amusements often involved great suffering of humans and animals. Animal-centered 
amusement parks and zoos have today generally established standards in the treatment of 
animals, but in the trade-offs for profit incentive they have not always lived up to them. 
Moreover, animal care and the ethics of captivity for whales, orcas, and other sea or land 
animals that cannot range has also invited moral debate and policy re-evaluation. Such 
amusements have invited criticism and a good deal of activism, much as have culturally-
sensitive (or perhaps better, insensitive) museum collections.  
13  M. Canevaro 2019, 155. He adds, “Historical instruction and poetical education were in fact 
part of the intellectual baggage of the average Athenian, provided by the city itself on very 
public occasions, be it the historical narrative of a funeral speech, the paintings in the Stoa 
Poikile, an honorary inscription in the Agora, a rhapsodic competition during the Panathenaea 
or the tragic competition at the Dionysia” (139). 
14 See Canevaro’s commentary, 151. 
15 Lombardini, 5.  
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16 On what I call the problem of rancorous humor, and on Zhuangzi-style smart humor as an 
antidote for it, see Axtell 2017b. 
17  Nylan 255. 
 
18 Nylan 254-255 discusses in this context Zhuangzi, “Running around accusing others is not as 
good as laughing, and enjoying good laugh less fine than going along with things. Be content to 
go along and forget [to dread] change, and then you can enter the mysterious Oneness of 
Heaven…. Just go along with things and let your faculties for thinking and feeling in the heart 
move freely. Best of all, resign yourself to what cannot be avoided and nourish whatever is 
within you.”  
19 Lombardini 12-13 quoting Halliwell, 2008, 37. Socrates’ accusers make his irony an instance 
of a sophistical trope: “It is this type of mockery that Strepsiades learns from Socrates and 
deploys against his creditors, doing so in a way that might be viewed as troubling from a 
democratic standpoint. In Plato, however, the portrait we find of Socratic humor, and its 
relationship to Athenian democracy, are radically different” even from what one finds in 
Xenophon (Lombardini, 49-50). Even though Socrates sometimes describes himself as 
laughable in the dialogues, it is typically an indication of proper humility (I sting like a torpedo 
fish, and I look like one, too) and genuine, shared philosophic wonderment (thauma) rather 
than rhetorical one-upsmanship. And in the few instances where Socrates actually laughs, it is 
intentionally highlighted by Plato that he does so ‘gently’ and ‘quietly’ (Phaedo, 84d; 115e). 
20 Nietzsche, “Homer’s Contest,” 180. This seems to me to apply to the Skeptics, and to the 
Hippocratic school also, whose empiricism led to many sharp criticisms of rationalist-dogmatist 
philosophy. Note also that Plato’s Socrates in his dialogues prays to the Muses on numerous 
occasions: for aid in remembering a conversation (Euthydemus 275c-d: “So I must begin my 
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description as the poets do, by invoking the Muses and Memory herself”); for aid in eloquence 
for his first speech on love, and again, to be a philosopher (Phaedrus 237a-b; 278b); at the start 
of an inquiry into the nature of justice; and contrasting philosophical inquiry with the poet’s 
‘just so’ stories about origins (Republic IV 432c; VIII 545d-e). See B. Darrell Jackson, “The 
Prayers of Socrates” (1971) for discussion. 
21 Paola Ceccarelli, in Castignola and Ceccarelli (eds.) Greek Memories, (2019, 103) confirms 
these Nietzschean insights on the agonistic character of Greek society and its connection with 
memorializing champions. 
22 Archibald Allen, “Solon’s Prayer,” 64. Solon interestingly speaks of “the blend of force and 
justice which is law.” Allen continues, “The aspect of the Muses' activity which is most 
familiar is their relation to poetry and music, but the wider extent of their power is not 
forgotten. So Plato can speak of a philosophic Muse (Phlb. 67B) and say that his ideal state will 
be realized when this Muse wins control of a city (Rep. 6.499D)”. The rationalist Muse of Plato 
would be associated with wisdom, but more specifically in the form of the Good. Republic 
244a-245c speaks of different kinds of beneficial mania: inspiration as per through a Muse, and 
a humane kind that seizes persons about to suffer or die, that they may more easily endure it. 
23 Dan O’Shannon, 2015, 7. 
24 The genealogy of the Muses was not taken as fully established by Homer and Hesiod, but has 
been a subject of inventive interest among later Greek and Roman poets, and even by 
philosophers including Plato. Scholars term this etiological play. Playing with Muse 
etymologies (‘etymological play’) allowed new blendings and pairings of older deities and their 
associated functions or provinces; it also allows for recognition of new fields of study which 
simply were not existent prior to the Greek golden age. So for example Plato finds a Muse of 
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philosophy, thereby supporting their competition with poets, sophists, or others vying for the 
crown of the most wise; history comes to have its own Muse, Clio, but this could occur only 
upon history’s distinction from mythology-bound epic poetry, the domain of Calliope who the 
epic poets unsurprising described as ‘chief’ of the Muses; and somewhat counterpoint to these 
logo-centric upstarts, Livius later created a distinctive literary goddess, Moneta, not quite 
identical with Mnemosyne, yet connected like her with divinized memory.  
25 Aristophanes, Frogs.  
26 Hardie, 571-572. 
27 For recent philosophical and psychological research on these topics see Michael Brady and 
other chapters in Laurie Candiotti (ed.) 2019 collection The Value of Emotions for Knowledge.  
28 For more on humor, laughter, amusement and pleasure in Chinese tradition, see especially 
Michael Nylan’s rich work, The Chinese Pleasure Book (2018). On smart humor in Zhuangzi 
in particular, see Axtell (2017b), Carl Dull (Helsing) (2012 and this volume), Moeller (2017), 
and Sellmann (1998). On connections with the concept of relational virtuosity discussed below, 
see the works of Peter Hershock and Roger Ames. 
29 T.D. Ritchie (et. al.), (2015), 278. 
30 For discussion of the “narrative alternative to theory of mind,” see Shaun Gallagher (2006), 
esp. 224, and Hutto’s response. See also Goldie, 2012. 
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31 Larry Hill quoted at http://www.indians.org/welker/stories1.htm. Relatedly, Psychology Today 
recently highlighted humans as storytelling animals. “We thrill to an astonishing multitude of 
fictions on pages, on stages, and on screens: murder stories, sex stories, war stories, conspiracy 
stories, true stories and false. We are, as a species, addicted to story. But the addiction runs 
deeper than we think. We can walk away from our books and our screens, but we can never 
walk away from story.”  
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-storytelling-animal/201205/creatures-story 
32 Martha Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance, 143-144. Nussbaum’s focus is not 
unconnected with our previous discussion of good and bad eris. J.S. Mill for example discusses 
in On Liberty (Chapter One) “the odium theologicum, in a sincere bigot” as being “one of the 
most unequivocal cases of moral feeling.” 
33 In a tradition going back at least to Francis Bacon, contemporary authors such as Herman 
(2017) and Boyd (2009) emphasize how fiction “increases the range of our vicarious 
experience and behavioral options.  “Fiction can design events and characters to provoke us to 
reflect on, say, generosity or threat, or deception and counter-deception. And it efficiently 
evokes our intense emotional engagement without requiring our belief. Discussed in Herman 
(2017), 5. See also Breyer, 2019. 
34 Nussbaum, 146. 
35 Whole cultures can value or devalue imagination, as Voltaire’s short story “Memory’s 
Adventure” makes clear through its satirical treatment of the rationalist tendencies of 
Descartes’ and Voltaire’s own French culture. Empirical research on aphantasia, the lack of 
voluntary mental imagery in some people, is interesting for moral psychologists because this 
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deficit in tools of imagery is found to have negative impact of social and emotional 
intelligence. 
36 Dewey, 1944, p. 148, my italics. Dewey wrote that “‘only gradually and with a widening of 
the area of vision through a growth of social sympathies does thinking develop to include what 
lies beyond our direct interest: a fact of great significance for education.”  
37 Fesmire 2010, 189 quoting Dewey, Art as Experience, LW 10:348.  On imagination, 
knowledge, and emotion see Any Kind and Peter Kung (eds.) Knowledge through Imagination 
(2016). On narrative see Harrellson 2012. Building on his earlier Dewey and Moral Imagination 
(2003), Fesmire (2012) explains how relational thinking not just in American pragmatism but 
also in much Eastern thought helps us better perceive the relational networks in which finite lives 
are embedded. Ecological thinking, as it enters into our deliberations about private choices and 
public policies, is a function of this sort of imagination. It aids moral awareness and serves as a 
tool of responsibility-through-action. “Ecological imagination is here understood as relational 
imagination shaped by key metaphors used in (though not necessarily originating in) the 
ecologies. That is, imagination is specifically ‘ecological’ when key metaphors and the like used 
in the ecologies organize mental simulations and projections. Our deliberations enlist ecological 
imagination when these imaginative structures (some of recent origin and some millennia old) 
shape what Dewey calls our dramatic rehearsals” (2012, 213). On William James’ distinction of 
the ‘crude’ and ‘subtle’ emotions, and the higher moral relevance of the latter, see Axtell 2017b. 
James I think was right to notice in Principles of Psychology “how unexpectedly great are the 
differences between individuals in respect of imagination.” Dewey’s developments of moral 
imagination seems to reflect this as well as James view that “No matter how emotional the 
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temperament may be, if imagination be poor, the occasions for touching off the emotional trains 
will fail to be realized, and the life will be pro-tonto cold and dry” (1981, 704; 1088). 
38 Andreas Leutzsch 2019, 152 and 116. 
39 Leutzsch, 3. He continues that “Almost-forgotten or sleeping history can be revived to 
legitimize an imagined future in a political discourse today.” Analyzing historical analogies as 
they appear in narratives, iconography, movies, journalism, etc. “enables us to understand how 
history and collective memory are managed and used for political purposes and to provide 
social orientation in time and space.” 
40 According to Maria Papova’s assessment, when the story writer and playwright James 
Baldwin said, “We made the world we’re living in and we have to make it over,” he was 
exploring the paradoxical ways in which we imprison ourselves even as we pursue our liberty. 
One the one hand, “we can only make a broken world over if we first closely examine its parts 
— that is, its pasts — and take responsibility for the conditions as well as the consequences of 
its brokenness. And yet, too often, we flee and burrow in the comforting certitude of our 
history, which is not the same as our past, no matter how false and hubristic such certitude may 
be.” 
41 Rosenberg 2018, Chapter 1.  
42 We can take the many theories of humor traditionally on offer, as O’Shannon does, as best 
seen as ‘parts in search of an elephant’: “when we gather these basic theories together, it begins 
to look as though people have been approaching comity from different directions. Some 
theories concerning the, these content, others are based on the feelings that arise from the 
comedic experience, and others are process-related” (2015, 10). These theories are not best 
seen as competitors for the roots of all humor. They address different questions and to this 
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extent invite interdisciplinary perspectives and not theoretical reduction. Yet they could still be 
components of some “larger, more comprehensive model” which took these different questions 
all into account.  
43 One sees this new ‘heroic’ virtue exemplified, for example, in the Tomorrowland movie 
characters Casey Newton, an optimistic teen who refuses to accept technological determinism 
and the easy moral rationalizations for inaction it supplies, and Athena, the more-human-than-
most-of-us android who recruits just such dreamers and innovative can-doers as Casey and the 
young (pre-jaded adult and ‘realist’) Frank Walker.  
44 Nietzsche reminds us that while envy, jealousy, or strife might translate Eris for both 
goddesses, Hesiod’s point is that they have quite different moral dispositions. “For the one, the 
cruel one, furthers the evil war and feud! This bad eris, as the elder, gave birth to black Night.” 
Many of the miseries sent to humans through Pandora’s ‘jar’ are of this kind. Zeus however is 
said to have placed the other Eris upon the roots of the earth and among men as a much better 
one. 
45 Hateful Eris as Hesiod presents it is the mother of “Battles and Fights, Murders and 
Manslaughters, Quarrels, Lying Words and Words Disputatious.” When these spawn of bad 
eris have their way, such forces are “unleashed from the where the house of Night stands, just 
beyond where Poseidon set doors as the edge of Tartarus to contain or ‘conceal’ them.” When 
they do, they unsettle that new order that arose in social contrast, with the birth of “Virgin 
Justice [Themis], Zeus’ own daughter, Honored and revered among the Olympian gods.”  
46 Bateman finds it scarcely surprising that ‘fake news,’ infotainment, and still more overt 
propaganda “thrives in systems that discourage fidelity and thus minimize productive 
community” (109). Fidelity, which is what binds us to other humans and their shared practices, is 
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a prime virtue that we need today: “fidelity is founded on the promise (literal or figurative) to be 
part of something and thus to foster knowledge within that community (whether we are talking 
sports, research, art, crafts, or anything else). Cyber-fidelity would therefore apply whenever our 
robots aided our commitment and our communities without simultaneously engendering our 
dependency.... What I’m calling cyber-fidelity is another name for what Ivan Illich calls 
convivial tools: technology that empowers individuals within their communities, rather than 
creating dependence and dividing or destroying community” (110; 137). 
47 Another Romantic thinker of the 19th century, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, held that the 
human condition is constituted more by our limitations than by our purposes, “by a person’s 
station contrasted with all other stations, and by this sad fact that his particular purposes must 
be chosen from amongst all other possible ones.” Thus for Goethe, a person’s “understanding 
may render him universal; his life never can …. The saddest truth is that to be at all you must 
be something in particular.” The true romantic’s emotions and imagination allow them to 
compensate by living vicariously not one but many lives. The romantic is thus the kind of 
Nietzschean sufferer: one who suffers from an overabundance of life, rather than from a paucity 
of it.  
